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STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff recovered judgment for $5ooo against the said
company and the city of St. Louis for injuries received on
account of alleged negligence of defendants in obstructing the
street in the city of St. Louis, by depositing thereon a lot of
iron pillars by said company with which his wagon collided,
in consequence whereof he lost his leg. The petition charged
negligence of 1aid company in placing the iron on the street,
and of the defendant city of St. Louis in permitting it to
remain thereon. The answer was a general denial and a plea
of contributory negligence.
DECISION.
The Supreme Court, MacFarlane,'Jo, delivering the opinion
said: There can be no doubt that the manufacturing com-
•pany had the right to make reasonable use of these streets
for the deposit of their manufactured goods, for the purpose
of loading and unloading them, though not directly authorized
by an ordinance of the city. But it had no right to make a
permanent use of the streets for storing its property, or to
make such temporary use as would unreasonably interfere
with travel. The reasonableness of the use should be
measured by the character of the articles to be handled. It
'Reported in 27 S. W. Rep. 615.
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appeared from the evidence that some of the iron pillars,
which is the obstruction in question, had been on the streets
for a number of days, and it was a proper question for the jury
to say whether they were allowed to remain an unreasonable
length of time. -We think that defendants could fairly have
been charged with negligence under the evidence.
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The question passed upon in the above case is of no little
interest and importance. It arose by reason. of the duty of
" municipal corporations to keep their streets and highways in
a proper state of repair, and free from obstructions,,, so that
they will be reasonably safe for travel; and if, having notice
of such defects or obstructions, they neglect to repair or
remove them, they will be liable for all injuries : provided that
he who received the injury was himself at the time, in the
exercise of due care."
To this strict rule, there is a well-recognized qualification,
which is declared by Judge Dillon in this language: "Bit it
is not every obstruction, irrespective of its character or purpose,
that is illegal, even though not sanctioned by any express
legislative or municipal authority. On the contrary, the right
of the public to the free and unobstructed use of a street or
way is subject to reasonable and necessary limitations and
restrictions. The.carriage and delivery of fuel, grain, goods,
etc., are legitimate uses of a street, and may result in a tempo-
rary obstruction of the right of public travel. Temporary
obstructions of this kind are not invasions- of. the public ease-
ment, but simply incident to or limitations of it. They can be
justified when, and only so long as they are reasonable ahd
necessary. There need be no absolute necessity; It suffices
that the necessity be a reasonable one:" Dillon Munic. Corp.,
§ 730.
At the common law, the obstruction of the highway by the
use of it for business purposes, for a long and unreasonable
time, was indictable as a nuisance. The earliest case, proba-
bly, that decided this was that of The Zing v. Russell, 6 East.
427. The defendant was charged with permitting his wagons
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to stand in the street before his warehouse for several hours at
a time both day and night, whereby the king's subjects were,
during that time, much impeded and obstructed. The court
said that the defendant could not legally carry on any part of'
his business in the public street, to the annoyance of the-
public; that the primary object of the street was for the free.
passage of the public, and anything which impeded that free-
passage, without necessity, was a nuisance ; that if the nature.
of the defendant's business were such as to require the loading
and unloading of so many more wagons than could con-
veniently be contained within his own private premises, he
must either enlarge his premises or remove his business to
some more convenient spot: See also Rex v. Jones, 3 Camp-
bell, 230 (1812).
A reasonable necessity justifies the use of the street for a
reasonable time. In 1814, ten years after the above case was
decided, the question as to what use of the public streets is
indictable as a .nuisance, arose in Pennsylvania in the case
of Commonsuealtt v. Passmore, i S. & R. 217. Tilghman, C. J.,
said: It is true that necessity justifies actions which would
otherwise be nuisances. It is true also that this necessity
need not be absolute, it is enough if it be reasonable. No.
man has a right to throw wood or stones into the street at his
pleasure. But inasmuch as fuel is necessary, a man may
throw wood into the street for the purpose of having it carried
to his house, and it may lie there a reasonable time. So,.
because building is necessary, stones, bricks, lime, sand and
other materials may be placed in the street, provided it be
done in the most convenient manner. On the same principle,
a-merchant may have his goods placed in the street, for the.
purpose of removing them to his store in a reasonable time.
But he has no right to keep them in the street for the purpose
of selling them there, because there is no necessity for it. I
can easily perceive that it is for the convenience and the
interest of an auctioneer to place his goods in the street,
because it saves the expense of storage. But I see no more
necessity in his case than that of a private merchant. It is
equally in the power of the auctioneer and the merchant to.
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xrocure warehouses and places of deposit in proportion to the
extent of their business.
The consideration that the property or persons causing the
obstruction is not under the direct control of the defendant
or Jhat the business is a lawful one, does not excuse him.
So in Rex v. Carlile, 6 Carr & Payne, 636, Baron Park said:
"If a. party, having a house in the street, exhibit effigies at
his windows, and thereby attract a crowd to look at them,
which causes the footway to be obstructed so that the public
cannot pass as they ought to do, this is an indictable nuisance.
This decision was followed by the Supreme Court of New
York in the case of The People v. Cunningham, I Denio, 524
(1845). Te defendants owned a brewerv, from which
extended a pipe about two feet over the curbstone, through
which the swill was emptied into the carts and wagons of
their customers. The number of teams-collected there was
so great that the street was frequently blocked from morning
to night, so that others were prevented from passing. The
court held it to be a nuisance and said: "The fact that the
defendants's business was a lawful one does not aff6rd them
'a justification in annoying the public in transacting it, The
defendants take possession of one side ofa public street from
which to supply their customers with an article furnished from
their distillery. By that act they invite those who deal with
them to come to that place to receive it with such vehicles as
they used; and the effect is to obstruct the street in the man-
ner complained of. This effect was, it seems to me, the prob-
able consequence of the defendants's acts. They furnished
the occasion and gave out the invitation, and no obstruction
of this kind would have taken place or would be likely to take
place in that street, if the occasion of the assembling of such
persons for the object mentioned was removed.
Building materials placed before a building in course of
erection is a legitimate use of the highway;' provided a free
and easy passage for all business and travelling purposes is left.
In Palmer v. Silverthorn, 32 Pa. 65, the plaintiff claimed
that defendant was answerable for the loss of his ox, which
had its leg broken in running over the building materials
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that defendant had placed in the highway. The court
affirmed the plaintiff's second point, which was a prayer for
instruction that, if the injury was occasioned by obstructions
placed in the highway by the. defendant, he would be liable,
with the qualification that if the defendant was at the time
putting up a building, and in doing so he used a reasonable
part of the highway, but no more than was conveniently
necessary to enable him to complete the erection, and there
was ample and sufficient room left for the passage of cattle
and persons travelling, it would be otherwise. The necessity
of the case was probably the foundation of the- rule, and is
the foundation of most laws and mnnicipal investigations.
In Philadelphi4 the occupation of a street by bilding mate-
rials is regulated by an ordinance passed May 3, 1855, § I,
144: "When any person or persons shall be about to erect
or repair any house or building within the city of Philadelphia,
and shall be desirous to occupy a part of the public street or
road for placing building materials thereon, he or they shall
make application to the license clerk, stating the number and
extent of such building, etc., and thereupon the license clerk
shall issue a written or printed permit to occupy such'part of
any public street, etc., not exceeding in extent the dimensions
of the front of the premises about to be built upon or repaired,
and eighty feet in addition thereto, and not exceeding nine
feet in breadth, for any time, not exceeding four months, as
shall be deemed necessary and reasonable. Provided, That a
sufficient passage or cartway shall at all times be left unen-
cumbered between said building materials and the opposite
curbstone for the passage of vehicles.. And, providedfuIrther,
That no building materials be placed within four feet of any
fire-plug, pump, or flagstone crossing, or within twelve inches
of any curbstone." Section 2 of the above ordinance pro-
vides that the permit allows the use of the high-'iay only for
the materials to be used in the said building. Section 3 pro-
vides for the erection of a wooden platform to extend along.
the front of the building. Similar ordinances exist in most of
our large cities.
In Massachusetts, the placing or maintaining stones or
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other obstructions in a public highway, without lawful
authority, is a nuisance at common law and indictable as
such: Commonwealth -v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234; Common-
wealth v. Zing, 13 Met. 115.
In the recent case of Loberg v. Amherst (Wis.), 58 N4. W.
io48, it was decided that the deposit of mortar boxes, neces-
sarily in use in plastering a house, upon a public highway, by
one hiaving the rights of an abutting owner, is not an unlawful
use of the highway where it is not unreasonably prolonged,
although they might have been placed in the bwner's yard.
-In the two cases of Mallory v. Griffey, 85 Pa. 275, and
Piollettv. Simmons, we see how injuries result by horses taking
fright at obstructions in the highway. In such instances the
negligence of the plaintiff in contributing to the injury is a
matter of defence, and ordinarily the burthen of proving it is
on the defendant.
The doctrine laid down in the earlier cases that the obstruc-
tion of the highway, to be lawful, must result from a necessary
and reasonable use thereof, was somewhat extended in the
case of City of Allegheny v. Zimmerman, 95 Pa. 293. Prior,
to the election of 1876, a Liberty Pole was erected in the
street, and a piece of it subsequently fell upon, and injured the.
plaintiff. Justice Mercur said, in delivering the opinion : Any
unreasonable obstruction of a highway is a public nui~ance,
for which an indictment will lie. It is not, however, every
obstruction in a highw.ay that constitutes a nuisance per se,
When it is not, and whether a particular use, is an unreason-
able use and a nuisance, is a question of faict to be submitted
to a jury. . . . But the right to partially obstruct a street does
not appear to be limited to a case of strict necessity; it may
extend to purposes of convenience or ornament, provided it
does not unreasonably interfere with public travel. Thus
public hacks, by authority of the municipality, may stand in
particular parts of the streets awaiting passengers, although
the public are thereby excluded from using that part of the
street most of the time. So shade trees may stand between
the sidewalk and the central part of the street without consti-
tuting a nuisance per se. They may become a nuisance by
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disease or decay, yet the mere partial obstruction of a part
of the street, when in fact such obstructiop does not interfere
with the public use, does not create a nuisance. It does not
work that hurt, inconvenience, or damage to the public, neces-
sary to constitute the offence: See also Walter v. cCornick,
52 N. J. L. 470.
From recent decisions it -would seem that the obstruction,
to be a nuisance, must be continuous. In Davis v. Curry,
154 Pa. 598, it was left for the jury to determine whether
the constantrepetition of the act of placing machinery and ca-st-
ings upon the sidewalk was such as to amount to substantial
continuity of obstruction as distinguished from the lawful,
temporary use of the sidewalk: Commonwealtk v. Finley, 15
Ky. L. Rep. 6o.
The right of property owners to leave objects on or along
a highway, in front of their premises, temporarily and for
special purposes, is of equal grade, before the law, with the
right of travellers to journey on the highway. Moreover it is
an absolute right and may be exercised in derogation of the
right of the travelling public: Piollett v. Summers, io6 Pa. 95.
What is a reasonable manner must always depend upon the
circumstances. In fadlo v. U. S. Express Co., 147 Pa. 404
(1892), the court said: "It might and doubtless would be
unsafe to leave such an obstruction (a small dark green safe)
as was described in this case, unguarded for a single moment
upon a sidewalk near a railway station, thronged by people
rushing to and from trains, while no inconvenience might be
apprehended from leaving the same obstruction several hours
upon a less frequented street. Hence, it is impossible to lay
down any precise rule as to the length of time a person may
allow his property to remain upon a highway without incurring
the charge of negligcnce."
In the later case of Davis v. Corry, supra, it was said:
Manufacturers, merchants, traders and carriers have their
warehouses, stores ,nd factories on the stree-s of cities and
towns. It is to interest of the public that these should
be carried on in crees and towns; to successfully do this,
necessarily the sidewalks and streets will be temporarily
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obstructed with bales and boxes of goods and the products
of the factory; they must ship and must move them; they
cannot reach the dray, wagon or cart without moving them
across the sidewalk.
In so far as this is a temporary and necessary obstruction
of the walk, and an inconvenience to the public passing over
it, the public in the common interest of trade and commerce
must submit to it. But while this is the case, it must not be
forgotten by municipal authorities that the sidewalks and
streets are primarily for the use of the passing public. The
merchants or manufacturer's right to the temporary, neces-
sary use of them is permissive only, and subordinate to that
of the public. See, also, Hindman v. Timme (Ind.), 35 N. E.
Rep. lO46; Illinois C. Ry. Co. v. State (Miss.), 14 Scr. Rep. 459;.
Taylor v. Bay City St. Ry. Co. (Mich.). 59 N. W. Rep. 447-
As to obstructions suspended- in the air by hoisting them
firom the street, see Fuhrmeister v. Wilson et al., 3o Atl. Rep.
I5O, decided October I, 1894.
From a review of the cases here discussed, then,.we deduce
these principles:
I. The primary purppse of a street or sidewalk is for the
passage and travel of the public.
II. Any obstruction of the public highway, 'to be lawful,
must be necessary, temporary, and reasonable. To this rule,
there is this qualification: The use of the street is nbt limited
to cases of strict necessity, but it may extend to purposes of
convenience or ornament, provided it does not unreasonably'
interfere with the public rights. I
H. GRAHAM BLEAKLY.
